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MOSTLY SETTLED, BUT RIGHT FOR NOW
SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF
PRECEDENT. By Randy J. Kozel.1 Cambridge University
Press. 2017. PP. x + 180. $99.99 (hardcover), $34.99 (paper).
Corinna Barrett Lain2
Randy Kozel’s book, Settled Versus Right: A Theory of
Precedent, is a laudable effort to make the law more stable, more
cohesive, more impersonal—to show that “legal rules can
endure . . . even as individual justices come and go” (pp. 18, 40).3
The core of the contribution is a proposed doctrine of stare decisis
that disentangles deference to precedent from the interpretive
methodologies that led to the precedent in the first place, and that
so often determine the amount of deference a decision gets—a
doctrine that aims to take disputes over interpretive methodology
out of the stare decisis equation. Kozel’s book is thoughtful and
coherent, meticulously making the case for why we need a better
theory of precedent and what it ought to look like, while
addressing counter-arguments and complexities as they arise
along the way. The writing is crisp and clear. The case is
persuasive. Settled Versus Right is an unequivocal success within
its domain.
Importantly, that domain is doctrinal. Kozel’s theory of
precedent aims to effectuate change within the four corners of the
law, and this is just as one might expect—as Kozel himself puts
the point, “Stare decisis is, at base, a legal doctrine” (p. 171). It is
a set of rules and principles designed to guide the Justices’
decisionmaking as to when to defer to precedent even when they

1. Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
2. S.D. Roberts and Sandra Moore Professor of Law, University of Richmond
School of Law.
3. See also RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT
176 (2017) (“Judges come and go, but the law remains the law. That is the promise of
precedent.”).
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think it is wrong. But what happens when we add decisionmaking
factors that operate outside of legal doctrine into the mix?
In this short essay, I focus on two: the Justices’ policy
preferences and the extra-legal context in which cases are
decided. The first—the Justices’ policy preferences—is clearly
within the realm of influences that Kozel aims to minimize (and
in a perfect world, prevent). Time and again, Kozel extols the
virtues of law over the proclivities of individuals, the importance
of enduring principles and precepts over the methodological and
normative commitments that vary from judge to judge (pp. 27, 3642, 45-49, 98-99, 103-106, 135, 175-176). These policy preferences
operate in and outside of doctrine. They manifest in the Justices’
interpretive methodologies, driving the approach to doctrinal
decisionmaking that the Justices find attractive, but also predate
those methodologies and influence judicial decisionmaking in
ways not fully captured in the formal operation of the law.
The second factor—the extra-legal context in which Justices
operate—is more clearly non-doctrinal, although as Kozel
recognizes, some interpretive methodologies explicitly recognize
larger societal change as a doctrinally relevant consideration (pp.
63-69). My interest in extra-legal context is broader than that; my
interest is the influence of extra-legal context on the Justices’
decisionmaking, whether or not interpretive methodologies
recognize that sort of influence as legitimate (or even recognize it
at all). In short, my interest is the realm of constitutional reality,
as opposed to constitutional law.
In the discussion that follows, I first explain why these nondoctrinal decisionmaking factors matter in a conversation about
stare decisis, and then explore how they might play out in the
doctrine if Kozel had his way. The point is to consider how Kozel’s
theory of precedent might work in practice as well as theory—that
is, to see how it might work beyond the strictly legal domain. As
a purely doctrinal project, Settled Versus Right naturally assumes
that if we fix the doctrine, we’ll fix the decisionmaking. I’m not
convinced that is true, not when non-doctrinal factors like policy
preferences and extra-legal context influence the Justices’
decisionmaking too. The best a theory of precedent can do, I
submit, is to minimize the most corrosive effects of these nondoctrinal influences—the discarding of precedent based on
nothing more than a change in the majority Justices’ views—while
accommodating the inevitable evolution of the law that comes
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with the passage of time. By this measure, Kozel’s proposed
doctrine fares remarkably well, limiting the avenues by which
non-doctrinal policy preferences might find expression while
leaving room for the law of stare decisis to respond to changes in
extra-legal context over time. To see what I mean requires a closer
look at how these non-doctrinal influences work in the first place,
starting with the Justices’ policy preferences.
I. THE JUSTICES’ POLICY PREFERENCES
On several occasions, Kozel cites Payne v. Tennessee4 for the
sort of Supreme Court decisionmaking that he hopes to prevent
with his theory of precedent (pp. 4, 35, 124-125), and the case
works well for highlighting the influence of non-doctrinal policy
preferences too. Payne is the 1991 decision that held that the
Eighth Amendment does not bar the admission of victim impact
evidence in the penalty phase of a capital trial.5 In so doing, it
overruled not one decision, but two. In Booth v. Maryland,
decided in 1987, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment barred the introduction of victim impact statements,
in part because those statements served only to inflame passions,
and in part because those statements introduced an element of
arbitrariness into death sentencing, allowing for the imposition of
death based on how beloved a victim was, or, worse yet, how well
the victim’s family could express grief.6 Two years later, in 1989’s
South Carolina v. Gathers, the Court followed Booth and
extended its reach to prosecutorial comments relating to victim
impact evidence as well.7 Payne wiped out both decisions in one
fell swoop, famously stating that “stare decisis is not an inexorable
command,”8 and establishing itself as ground zero for the sort of
instability in the stare decisis doctrine that makes Kozel’s project
so worthwhile today.

4. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
5. See id. at 827.
6. 482 U.S. 496, 505–07; 521 n.8 (1987). See also Payne, 501 U.S. at 846 (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (“As Justice Powell explained in Booth, the probative value of such evidence
is always outweighed by its prejudicial effect because of its inherent capacity to draw the
jury’s attention away from the character of the defendant and the circumstances of the
crime to such illicit considerations as the eloquence with which family members express
their grief and the status of the victim in the community.”).
7. 490 U.S. 805, 810–11 (1989) (reiterating reasoning in Booth and applying it to the
prosecutor’s argument to the jury).
8. Payne, 501 U.S. at 828.
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As to what had changed in the intervening four years, the
answer was twofold, and their names were Brennan and Powell.
Both Justices had been part of the Booth majority and both had
retired by 1990, sending Justices Souter and Kennedy to the bench
in their stead and shifting the balance on the Supreme Court. In a
stinging dissent, Justice Marshall called out the result in Payne for
what it was, stating:
Power, not reason, is the new currency of this Court’s
decisionmaking . . . . Neither the law nor the facts supporting
Booth and Gathers underwent any change in the last four years.
Only the personnel of this Court did . . . There is nothing new
in the majority’s discussion of the supposed deficiencies in
Booth and Gathers. Every one of the arguments made by the
majority [today] can be found in the dissenting opinions filed
in those two cases, and, as I show in the margin, each argument
was convincingly answered. . . . 9

It is tempting to say that the dissent was just being the dissent, but
what Justice Marshall wrote was true—neither the law nor the
factual understandings underlying Booth and Gathers had
changed over the previous four years. None of the arguments
were new. Indeed, not even a shift in the predominant interpretive
methodology on the Court can explain the result in Payne. The
majority’s opinion wasn’t about original meaning, or original
intent, or a reading of constitutional text; it was about fairness
through and through. A capital trial is all about the defendant, the
majority reasoned; it ought to be about the victim too.10 Indeed,
in Payne, Justice Scalia wrote separately to note that this keen
sense of fairness had “found voice in a nationwide ‘victims’ rights’
movement” that deserved respect lest it “diminish respect for the
courts and for law itself”11—quite the statement given his disdain

9. Id. at 484–86 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
10. See id. at 825 (“[J]ust as the murderer should be considered as an individual, so
too the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in
particular to his family.”); id. at 826 (“The Supreme Court of Tennessee in this case
obviously felt the unfairness of the rule pronounced by Booth when it said: ‘It is an affront
to the civilized members of the human race to say that, at sentencing in a capital case, a
parade of witnesses may praise the background, character and good deeds of Defendant
. . . but nothing may be said that bears upon the character of, or the harm imposed, upon
the victims.’”).
11. Id. at 834 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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for constitutional decisionmaking that considered political
mobilization in a different, but nearly contemporaneous context.12
If Payne teaches anything, it is that the Justices’ policy
preferences will, in practice, impact the Court’s fidelity to
precedent even when interpretive methodologies provide no
cover for those views. Indeed, as Fred Schauer’s essay in this
volume notes, empirical evidence has long shown this to be true.13
Non-doctrinal policy preferences impact the Justices’ doctrinal
decisionmaking, and the doctrine of stare decisis is no exception
to that rule.
Two further illustrations round out the point, each offering a
slightly different insight. The first is Dickerson v. United States,
the 2000 decision that ostensibly reaffirmed the constitutional
legitimacy of Miranda v. Arizona.14 On several occasions, Kozel
cites Dickerson as an example of the Justices properly deferring
to precedent (pp. 35, 79-80, 118), and this is readily
understandable—the majority in Dickerson explicitly declined to
overrule Miranda with the statement, “Whether or not this Court
would agree with Miranda’s reasoning and its rule in the first
instance, stare decisis weighs heavily against overruling it now.”15
But the case is not the star of stare decisis that it seems. Chief
Justice Rehnquist, who authored the opinion in Dickerson, had
been undermining Miranda’s constitutional legitimacy for years;16
indeed, he had written a DOJ memo condemning the decision
before joining the bench, and may well have written a second DOJ
memo opining that Miranda warnings “are not themselves
12. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 999–1000 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment and dissenting in part) (“How upsetting it is, that so many of our
citizens (good people, not lawless ones, on both sides of this abortion issue, and on various
sides of other issues as well) think that we Justices should properly take into account their
views, as though we were engaged not in ascertaining an objective law but in determining
some kind of social consensus.”).
13. See Frederick Schauer, On Treating Unlike Cases Alike, 33 CONST. COMMENT.
437, 439–40 (2018). For renewed validation of the original work on the attitudinal model,
see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
14. 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (striking down legislation purporting to overrule Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
15. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443.
16. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (Rehnquist, C.J., writing
for the majority) (describing Miranda as “procedural safeguards [that] were not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution”); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654
(1984) (Rehnquist, C.J., writing for the majority) (“The prophylactic Miranda warnings . . .
‘are not themselves rights protected by the Constitution. . . .’”);
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constitutional absolutes”17—the same position he would later take
as a Justice and that, ironically, would be the basis for defending
the statute that the Supreme Court would strike down in
Dickerson. Why, then, would Chief Justice Rehnquist author an
opinion rejecting a position that he himself had taken? Why
would he lead the charge to affirm the constitutional legitimacy of
Miranda when he had been undermining it for years?
The answer is necessarily speculative, but it is worth noting
that the vote in Dickerson was 7-2, and would have been a solid 63 even if Chief Justice Rehnquist had joined the dissenters.
Rehnquist could not change the outcome, but by siding with the
majority, he could save the opinion for himself and uphold
Miranda in the weakest way humanly possible—which is exactly
what he did. Although the majority opinion described Miranda as
a “constitutional rule” that could not be invalidated by statute,18
it refused to say (despite taunting by the dissenters) that Miranda
was constitutional in the only way that mattered—it refused to say
that violating Miranda was a violation of the Constitution too. As
Justice Scalia noted wryly in dissent, “[The opinion] cannot say
that, because a majority of the Court does not believe it [to be
true].”19 What Dickerson illustrates best, I submit, is not fidelity
to precedent, but rather the Justices’ ability to undermine stare
decisis even when it looks like they are following the rule.
The final case, briefly, is Hudson v. Michigan, a 2006 decision
that held that knock-and-announce violations of the Fourth
Amendment do not merit the exclusionary rule.20 Hudson would
be relatively unremarkable, were it not for what the Supreme
Court had to say about the exclusionary rule itself. In rejecting the

17. The first DOJ memo was an internal 19-page memorandum from Rehnquist to
then-Associate Deputy Attorney General John Dean. The second was an external memo,
sent to all US attorneys and ostensibly from then-Attorney General John Mitchell, while
Rehnquist was the head of the Office of Legal Counsel. For an excellent discussion of both
memos, see Yale Kamisar, Dickerson v. United States: The Case That Disappointed
Miranda’s Critics - And Then Its Supporters, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 106, 112–14
(Curtis Bradley ed., 2006).
18. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432, 444.
19. Id. at 446 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 445 (“One will search today’s
opinion in vain, however, for a statement (surely simple enough to make) that . . . the use
at trial of a voluntary confession, even when a Miranda warning or its equivalent has failed
to be given—violates the Constitution. The reason the statement does not appear is . . .
that Justices whose votes are needed to compose today’s majority are on record as
believing that a violation of Miranda is not a violation of the Constitution.”).
20. 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
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exclusionary rule’s application and explaining its hostility to the
rule, the Court stated, “We did not always speak so guardedly,”
adding: “Expansive dicta in Mapp, for example, suggested wide
scope for the exclusionary rule. (‘[A]ll evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that
same authority, inadmissible in state court’).”21 The problem is
what 1961’s Mapp v. Ohio actually said: “We hold that all evidence
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution
is, by that same authority, inadmissible in state court.”22 I added
emphasis to the quote to most clearly make the point: The
Supreme Court in Hudson (Justice Scalia writing for the majority)
lopped off the words “We hold that” and then called Mapp’s
holding dicta. Notwithstanding Kozel’s claim that the holdingdicta divide is more porous than it seems, Hudson is a stark
illustration of how the Justices’ characterization of precedent can
erode stare decisis too.
All this is to say that Kozel’s project of producing a coherent
theory of precedent is complicated by a much messier
decisionmaking reality, one that resists rules and precepts when
those constructs get in the way of where the Justices want to go.
This is not to fault Kozel’s project for being limited to the
doctrinal context. Doctrinal work is hugely important; indeed, it
is the very fabric of the law itself. But it is to say that the Justices’
policy preferences will affect how Kozel’s theory works in
practice, and that how all this might play out is a worthy question
of its own.
II. EXTRA-LEGAL CONTEXT
The second non-doctrinal influence—the extra-legal context
in which the Justices operate—is equally important and impactful.
Kozel recognizes this influence in the context of interpretive
methodologies that explicitly condone it, but my focus here is
neither normative nor doctrinal. My focus is on the larger
historical backdrop against which doctrinal decisionmaking
occurs, which may or may not be captured in doctrine and may or
may not be something to condone.
Sometimes the influence of extra-legal context is a good
thing. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court’s iconic 1954
21.
22.

Id. at 591 (citation omitted).
367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). See also Hudson, 547 U.S. at 608 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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decision in Brown v. Board of Education.23 It wasn’t doctrine that
led to the one of the most (if not the most) celebrated decisions in
Supreme Court history; indeed, one searches in vain for any
doctrinal recognition whatsoever of the tectonic shift in race
relations that we now know was driving the Justices’
decisionmaking in the case.24
Other times the influence of extra-legal context is a bad
thing. Examples in this category include Plessy v. Ferguson, the
1896 decision that upheld “separate but equal” racial
classifications;25 Buck v. Bell, the 1927 decision that upheld
involuntary sterilization of the hereditary “feebleminded”;26 and
Korematsu v. United States, the 1944 decision that upheld the
removal of Japanese Americans from their homes during World
War II.27 All three of these decisions are among the most
maligned in Supreme Court history, but as I have argued
elsewhere, the historical context in which they were decided made
it almost unfathomable for the Court to have ruled the other
way.28 For better or worse, extra-legal context matters—
regardless of whether it matters in formal doctrine—because it
determines what is plausible, and influences what is attractive, in
the realm of rights claims.
One might contend that none of this holds for decisions based
on originalist methodology, which explicitly rejects the notion of
a living Constitution. But that would not be true. Consider, for
example, District of Columbia v. Heller, the 2008 decision that
recognized an individual right to possess firearms independent of
service in state militia.29 Heller is, as others have noted, a
23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24. See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940–1985) 649 (Del Dickson ed.,
2001) (quoting Justice Reed in conference discussion on Brown as stating, “Think of the
advancements. . . . Segregation is gradually disappearing.”); id. at 652 (quoting Justice
Jackson in Brown conference as stating that segregation was “nearing an end”); id. at 660
(quoting Justice Minton in Brown conference as stating, “The only justification for
segregation is the inferiority of the Negro. So many things have broken down these
barriers.”); id. at 658 (quoting Justice Burton in Brown conference as noting “a trend away
from separation of the races in restaurants). For additional statements outside the
conference context, particularly from Justices Frankfurter and Clark, see Corinna Barrett
Lain, Upside-Down Judicial Review, 101 Geo. L.J. 113, 123–24 (2012).
25. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
26. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
27. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
28. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Three Supreme Court “Failures” and a Story of
Supreme Court Success, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1019, 1021–22 (2016).
29. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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testament to the “Triumph of Originalism”30—it is “the most
explicitly and self-consciously originalist opinion in the history of
the Supreme Court.”31
But Heller is difficult, if not impossible, to understand outside
of the extra-legal context in which it was decided. For the first two
hundred years of the Second Amendment’s existence, the right to
bear arms was understood as a response to concerns raised during
the ratification process that without the amendment, Congress
would be able to disarm state militias.32 Indeed, no court—state
or federal—had ever ruled otherwise; the first time a lower court
invoked the Second Amendment to invalidate gun control
legislation was the D.C. Circuit’s 2007 ruling in Heller itself.33
When the NRA began its campaign to change this understanding
of the Second Amendment—and it literally was a campaign34—
then-Chief Justice Burger, a Nixon appointee, publicly called the
effort “one of the greatest pieces of fraud, I repeat the word fraud,
on the American public by special interest groups that I have ever
seen in my lifetime.”35 Robert Bork, one of originalism’s original

30. Linda Greenhouse, Three Defining Opinions, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2008, at WK4.
31. Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122
HARV. L. REV. 246, 246 (2008).
32. See Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in
Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008) (discussing evolution of the claim that the Second
Amendment contained an individual right to bear arms, starting with the presumption
from the start—recognized in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), numerous lower
court decisions, and various Congressional reports in the 1960s, when Congress was
considering gun control legislation in the wake of President Kennedy’s assassination—that
it did not); see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the Second
Amendment “was a response to concerns raised during the ratification of the Constitution
that the power of Congress to disarm the state militias and create a national standing army
posed an intolerable threat to the sovereignty of the several States.”).
33. See Parker v. Dist. of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007), aff’d, Dist. of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); see also Sunstein, supra note 31, at 252 (“A quiz
question: when was the first time a lower federal court invoked the Second Amendment
to invalidate a state or federal law? Answer: Heller itself, in 2007. In well over half a
century, the Court had many opportunities to reject the established view within the lower
federal courts; it never did so.”).
34. See Siegel, supra note 32, at 202–36 (providing historical account of NRA position
on gun control, which in the 1960s was supportive of reasonable regulation but in the 1970s
shifted to a libertarian “no compromise” mode, and detailing the campaign that came with
the shift).
35. See id. at 224 (quoting Chief Justice Burger’s comments on THE MACNEIL
LEHRER NEWS HOUR (PBS Television Broadcast Dec. 16, 1991)).
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thinkers, had a more doctrinal response to the NRA’s interpretive
claim: “But that’s not the original understanding.”36
Fast forward to 2008, when the majority in Heller disagreed.
Lacking the space here for a deep dive into the historical record,
it suffices to say that both the majority and dissent made claims
about the original meaning of the Second Amendment, and the
majority’s support for its newfound claim was problematic in
numerous ways.37 Yet my point here is less about whether the
result in Heller was right or wrong, and more about the role of
extra-legal context in producing that result in the first place. Even
if the majority in Heller got the history right, that still doesn’t
explain why, as Cass Sunstein notes, it took the Supreme Court
over two hundred years to figure it out.38 What made Heller
happen in 2008 when it was utterly unimaginable just a few
decades earlier? The answer is the rise of an immensely influential
gun rights movement, one that produced position papers, funded
scholarship, lobbied legislatures, supported political campaigns,
and changed the public discourse, all with the aim of transforming
constitutional politics into constitutional law.39 This is not to say
that the majority in Heller was not interpreting the Second
Amendment in good faith; I assume it was. But it is to say that
Heller was as much a product of contemporary understandings as

36. See id. (quoting Robert Bork’s comments in Miriam Bensimhorn, Advocates:
Point and Counterpoint, Laurence Tribe and Robert Bork Debate the Framers’ Spacious
Terms, LIFE MAGAZINE, Fall 1991).
37. For an extended discussion of the reasons why the majority’s reading of the
Second Amendment did not make sense as a matter of original intent or original meaning,
see Siegel, supra note 32, at 196-201. See also Sunstein, supra note 31, at 255–57 (discussing
work of historians who insist that the Supreme Court got the history in Heller wrong and
concluding that “the subtlety, nuance, acknowledgement of counterarguments, and (above
all) immersion in Founding-era debates, characteristic of good historical work, cannot be
found in Heller.”). Interestingly (but an aside given the reason I discuss Heller here), the
majority in Heller also disregarded the doctrine of stare decisis. See infra note 41.
38. See Sunstein, supra note 31, at 252 (“Even if the Court’s understanding of the
original public meaning is correct, why did the Court vindicate that understanding in 2008?
Why not in 1958, or 1968, 1978, 1988, or 1998? . . . Indeed, for many decades, no member
of the Court showed the slightest inclination to hold that the Second Amendment protects
the right to have a gun for nonmilitary uses. Why did the Court accept that view in 2008?”).
39. See Siegel, supra note 32, at 202–36 (providing detailed account of gun rights
movement); id. at 224–25 (noting that between 1970 and 1989, at least 19 of the 27 law
review articles espousing the view that the Second Amendment protected an individual
right to bear arms were written by lawyers who were either directly employed by, or
represented, the NRA or other guns rights organizations, although they did not always
self-identify in the author’s footnote).
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originalist ones, even though, ironically, the doctrine was fiercely
against considering contemporary views.
The point in all this, here again, is that extra-legal context
(like the Justices’ policy preferences) adds a wrinkle to Kozel’s
project. In theory, fixing the doctrine of stare decisis will fix the
Justices’ decisionmaking in this area (at least as much as one can
in a world of diverse interpretive methodologies). But in practice,
extra-legal context will affect the Justices’ decisionmaking too,
and how that might play out in the context of Kozel’s theory is a
question worth considering all its own.
III. CONSIDERING KOZEL’S THEORY IN PRACTICE
In the remainder of this essay, I consider how Kozel’s theory
might work in practice—that is, how a theory built for the purely
doctrinal domain might work when non-doctrinal decisionmaking
considerations like policy preferences and extra-legal context are
added to the mix. To do that, I first summarize Kozel’s proposed
doctrine. I then explore how the doctrine might play out with
these non-doctrinal influences in mind.
As previously noted, the central aim of Kozel’s proposed
doctrine is to take disputes over interpretive methodology out of
the stare decisis equation. As Kozel puts the point, the aim is “to
demand a special justification for overruling a precedent . . . that
goes beyond disagreement with the precedent’s reasoning” (p.
118). To effectuate that aim, Kozel proposes to eliminate current
stare decisis considerations like jurisprudential coherence,
flagrancy of error, and a precedent’s perceived harmfulness; these
considerations, he reasons, too closely track the Justices’ views of
a decision on the merits (pp. 103-104). At the same time, Kozel
proposes to keep (albeit in narrowly construed form) current
considerations such as procedural workability, factual accuracy,
and reliance expectations; these considerations, he reasons, are
relatively distinct from an inquiry into a decision’s methodological
merits (pp. 103-104).
Knowing the general contours of Kozel’s proposed theory,
the discussion can now turn to how it might work in practice.
Again, in my mind, the best a theory of precedent can do is to
minimize the most corrosive effects of non-doctrinal
decisionmaking—the Justices’ proclivity to overrule precedent
just because they disagree with it—while accommodating
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transformations in the extra-legal context that would impact
constitutional decisionmaking in any event and otherwise force
the Justices to mangle and manipulate the doctrine. With these
goals as my guide, how does Kozel’s proposed doctrine do?
The answer is: remarkably well, actually. Consider first the
doctrine’s ability to constrain the Justices’ policy preferences. I
start with the frank recognition that if the Justices are determined
to overrule precedent, that’s what they’re going to do. To borrow
from an earlier context, if the Justices are willing to lop off the
words “We hold that” and then call what follows dicta, there is no
theory of precedent that can hold them.40 There is nothing that
doctrine can do.
Short of that, however, Kozel’s proposed doctrine would
appear to constrain as much as possible the Justices’ ability to
discard precedent based on pure policy preferences—largely by
eliminating doctrinal considerations that allow for differences in
interpretive methodology to come into play. By eliminating
considerations like jurisprudential coherence, flagrancy of error,
and a precedent’s perceived harmfulness, Kozel’s proposed
doctrine removes the chief doctrinal considerations that allow for
a Justice’s disagreement with precedent on the merits to come
into play. Granted, Kozel’s interest is the purely doctrinal domain;
his aim in this project is, again, to minimize the corrosive effects
of interpretive pluralism on the doctrine of stare decisis. But in
doing so—in minimizing the doctrine’s capacity to reflect
disagreement with precedent on the merits—Kozel manages to
minimize the corrosive effects of the Justices’ policy preferences
too.
This is not to say that Kozel’s proposal would completely
eliminate the opportunity for policy preferences to seep through
in the doctrine. Justices who disagree with precedent on the
merits could still claim that a decision is unworkable in practice,
or that it is based on factual inaccuracies, or that it has relatively
low reliance interests supporting it.41 Justices would also still have
40. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
41. Heller is a striking example of the latter. Compare Dist. of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570, 637 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Since our decision in [United States v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939),] hundreds of judges have relied on the view of the Amendment
we endorsed there; we ourselves affirmed it in 1980.”) with id. at 2815 n. 24 (“As for the
‘hundreds of judges’ who have relied on the view of the Second Amendment Justice
Stevens claims we endorsed in Miller: If so, they overread Miller. And their erroneous
reliance upon an uncontested and virtually unreasoned case cannot nullify the reliance of
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room to disregard a decision by reading the scope of its ruling
narrowly, a problem that Kozel recognizes as “thorny and
contentious,” with no easy answers (p. 7). Unless the case under
consideration is on all fours with precedent, the Justices’ ruling in
that case will either extend the precedent’s reach or limit it, and
where there is room to do either, the Justices’ normative precommitments will bleed through. But I see these sorts of
opportunities for policy preferences to find expression in the
doctrine as a necessary cost of doing business in this area, and the
best that even a so-called “second best” theory of precedent can
do (p. 13).42
I consider separately Kozel’s recognition of “extraordinary
harm” as a doctrinally legitimate consideration in exceptional
cases (pp. 14, 123). These cases, Kozel explains, are those in which
the precedent is “not merely unfair, but profoundly immoral,” an
“intolerable affront” to democratic or other foundational norms
(p. 122). In Kozel’s mind, Brown v. Board of Education’s rejection
of “separate but equal” in Plessy can be readily understood in this
manner (p. 102). The problem, however—at least by way of
measuring the doctrine against its ability to minimize the
influence of policy preferences—is that this doctrinal
consideration is all about disagreement with a decision on the
merits. It is simply a safety valve for when a majority of Justices
conclude that their disagreement with a decision on the merits is
extreme.
The question then becomes whether the “extraordinary
harm” exception is the exception that swallows the rule, whether
it invites the very same merits-based treatment of precedent that
Kozel works so hard to exclude elsewhere. As a cautionary tale,
Payne v. Tennessee is once again instructive. In Payne, the
majority quoted the Tennessee Supreme Court’s articulation of
the fairness point that drove its decisionmaking, stating:
It is an affront to the civilized members of the human race to say
that, at sentencing in a capital case, a parade of witnesses may
praise the background, character, and good deeds of [the

millions of Americans (as our historical analysis has shown) upon the true meaning of the
right to keep and bear arms.”).
42. For a discussion of Kozel’s “second-best” approach to the scope of precedent, see
Kozel supra note 3, at 145–54.
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defendant] . . . but nothing may be said that bears upon the
character of, or the harm imposed, upon the victims.43

I added emphasis to the opening line, so readers probably know
where I’m going: If Payne is a prime example of the sort of
decisionmaking that Kozel’s theory of precedent aims to prevent,
it is not clear that his proposed doctrine would actually do that
here. What it might do instead is simply incentivize the Justices to
state their disagreement with precedent in the strongest of terms.
That said, by creating a safety valve in the doctrine for the
Justices to express their disagreement with precedent on the
merits, and by limiting the relevance of those disagreements to the
“rare and exceptional situations” (p. 123) where the precedent is
extraordinarily harmful (as opposed to just flagrantly wrong),
Kozel’s proposed doctrine at least channels non-doctrinal policy
preferences into a forum where they can be debated directly. As
Kozel puts the point, it places on the Justices an “argumentative
burden” to justify why adherence to precedent is so
fundamentally wrong that discarding it under the doctrine of stare
decisis is right (p. 133). Here again, this strikes me as perhaps the
best that a doctrine not built for recognizing the influence of nondoctrinal policy preferences can do.
What about the doctrine’s ability to accommodate the
inevitable influence of extra-legal change? Here the question is
not what Kozel’s proposed doctrine is able to keep out, but rather
what it is able to let in. Yet the answer is the same: it does
remarkably well. To see why, I return to what Kozel identifies as
the core considerations under his proposed doctrine: a
precedent’s procedural workability, factual accuracy, and reliance
expectations.
It is entirely possible that the sort of tectonic extra-legal
change I have discussed might find expression in a precedent’s
procedural workability, but I don’t see that as an obvious outlet
for extra-legal change,44 so I will focus my comments on Kozel’s
other two doctrinally legitimate considerations, starting with
43. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 826 (1991) (quoting State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d
10, 19 (Tenn. 1990)).
44. Kozel construes the procedural workability component of his second-best
doctrine of stare decisis narrowly, focusing only on whether the rule is “clear enough for
courts to understand and apply” as opposed to “hopelessly convoluted or exceedingly
vague” (p. 110). I don’t see extra-legal context impacting that analysis, but I also don’t rule
it out.
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factual accuracy. As Kozel notes in his discussion of this
consideration, “Judicial decisions contain factual premises, and
those premises can be wrong” (p. 110). When that happens—that
is, when a decision’s factual premise has eroded to such an extent
that it no longer supports the holding—Kozel’s theory of
precedent maintains that the precedent can be discarded (pp. 111113).45 Importantly, Kozel construes the notion of factual
accuracy narrowly. He is interested in only the most objective of
changes in facts (technological advances are an example he uses
(p. 112)) as opposed to “the opinions and values through which
reality is understood” (p. 111).
But I don’t see that distinction as doing much work in
practice—how are the Justices to know when a change in facts is
objective or just objective through the lens in which their reality
is understood? Extra-legal context changes both facts and the way
we view them, and distinguishing between the two would seem an
impossible task. But more to the point, when a decision’s factual
premise has eroded to such an extent that it no longer supports
the holding, that is true whether the eroded premise is the result
of technological change or some change in a social fact.
Consider again Brown v. Board of Education, which Kozel
sees as too broad an application of the factual accuracy
consideration (p. 111),46 but I see as an instructive example. In
Brown, the Supreme Court cited new research establishing the
harms of racially segregated schooling as a changed circumstance
that rendered Plessy obsolete.47 But more than just research had
changed in that case. As the Justices later said of Brown in 1992:
“[T]he Plessy Court’s explanation for its decision was so clearly at
odds with the facts apparent to the Court in 1954” that the Court

45. Kozel does not say that precedent must be discarded in these situations, only that
it can be without breaking the stare decisis rules (p. 113).
46. I leave to the reader what it says about Kozel’s theory that he needs an
“extraordinary harm” exception to accommodate Brown, having drawn his doctrinally
legitimate considerations so narrowly that under his theory, they would not otherwise
legitimate Brown’s rejection of Plessy, even as late as 1954.
47. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). Returning to my first point
in text, it is not clear to me (and I can’t imagine how it would be clear to the Justices) how
the new research in Brown would not be an objective fact, but technological change would
be. Indeed, one could argue that research establishing a changed fact is actually more
objective than the Justices determining a changed fact (like technological change) for
themselves. Perhaps the answer is in the obviousness of the change, but at the Supreme
Court level, rarely is anything that obvious.
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in Brown was right to reject it.48 The implicit premise of Plessy
was that the races were unequal; once the Justices recognized that
premise not to be true, the force of Plessy as precedent dissipated,
allowing the Justices to forge a new rule.49
In this regard, Brown is but one example of a much larger
phenomenon; I could have cited the Supreme Court’s recognition
of changed facts as the mechanism by which larger societal change
made its way into the law in the women’s rights or gay rights
context instead.50 As others have recognized and developed at
length, fact-based adjudication is a primary means by which our
slowly evolving understanding of the world finds expression in the
law; indeed, the Supreme Court’s recognition of changed facts is
often the first step in the evolution of larger constitutional
norms.51 As Lawrence Friedman puts the point, “The obvious
becomes dubious, the dubious obvious,” and the law responds
accordingly.52 Kozel’s recognition of factual accuracy as a
legitimate consideration in the doctrine of stare decisis provides
an important outlet for extra-legal context to find expression in
the law,53 even though this is not his aim in including it.
48. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992). For an earlier, but related
example, see Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 383 (1946) (striking down de jure
segregation in interstate commerce and noting that “People of all races travel today more
extensively than in 1878 when this Court first passed upon state regulation of racial
segregation in commerce”).
49. Indeed, one can see this exact line of reasoning in the Justices’ comments in the
Brown conference. See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 24, at 660
(quoting Justice Minton as stating, “The only justification for segregation is the inferiority
of the Negro. So many things have broken down these barriers”). For additional Brown
conference comments, see supra note 24.
50. Compare Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (noting “the
natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex” as justifying
their exclusion from the practice of law) with Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971) (noting
that today “a large proportion of estates, both intestate and under wills of decedents, are
administered by surviving widows” in invalidating as arbitrary a state’s statutory
presumption that men administer estates). See also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584,
2596 (2015) (“For much of the 20th century, moreover, homosexuality was treated as an
illness. . . . Only in more recent years have psychiatrists and others recognized that sexual
orientation is both a normal expression of human sexuality and immutable.”).
51. For an excellent discussion of the phenomenon, see Suzanne B. Goldberg,
Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and Fact-Based Adjudication,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (2006).
52. Lawrence M. Friedman, Judging the Judges: Some Remarks on the Way Judges
Think and the Way Judges Act, in NORMS AND THE LAW 139, 154 (John N. Droback ed.,
2006).
53. Indeed, attentiveness to stare decisis while preserving judicial flexibility may be
why fact-based adjudication is so prevalent in the first place. See Goldberg, supra note 51,
at 2003–07.
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The same can be said of the reliance interests that Kozel’s
theory of precedent deems a legitimate consideration in the
doctrine of stare decisis. As Kozel recognizes, Supreme Court
decisions by their nature create significant reliance expectations
(pp. 116-118); the country has heard the Court’s ruling on an issue,
and we are told it is the final word.54 It is only natural that private
and public actors will rely on those decisions as they go about their
own affairs, and only right to consider those reliance interests in
considering whether precedent ought to be discarded. Here again,
Kozel construes the relevant reliance interests narrowly; he is
interested in public and private reliance interests—reliance by the
coordinate branches, private expectations grounded in property
and contract, and the like—but not “reliance by society at large”
(p. 117). The latter reliance interests, he reasons, “do not depend
on the concrete expectations of stakeholders” and are
“necessarily more abstract” (p. 117).
I don’t get it. The distinction seems arbitrary not only
because both types of reliance interests matter, and matter deeply
to those doing the relying, but also because (and more
importantly for Kozel’s project) both present non-merits-based
inquiries. One need not get tangled up in dueling interpretive
methodologies to assess reliance interests of any of these sorts as
an analytically independent inquiry.
That said, I’m once again not sure how much the theory’s
distinction would matter in practice, as I think the line it draws
has plenty of blurred edges. If the Supreme Court were to
consider overturning its recognition of the right to same-sex
marriage, for example, would the reliance interest at stake be a
social interest not entitled to weight, or an interest grounded in
contract and property rights that ought to be weighed heavily? It
may be the case that some social reliance interests are more purely
social—that is, not bound up in property and contract rights and
the like—but my guess is that many cases that give rise to
“reliance by society at large” in turn give rise to concrete
expectations by private actors and the coordinate branches as
well.

54. Just how final the Supreme Court’s word really is, is a question all its own and
one I have explored elsewhere. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Soft Supremacy, 58 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1609 (2017).
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To the extent I’m right about that (and perhaps even if I’m
not), one can imagine how the consideration of reliance interests
would allow Kozel’s proposed doctrine to accommodate the sort
of extra-legal change that inevitably influences the evolution of
the law over time. Reliance interests dissipate as society passes a
precedent by. Laws gradually become less enforced until they slip
into a state of desuetude, and decisions get distinguished, chipped
away, and ignored until they die on the vine. The process proceeds
slowly, but it is as natural as the air we breathe. In recognizing
reliance interests as a legitimate consideration in the doctrine of
stare decisis, Kozel’s theory of precedent leaves room for changes
in extra-legal context to find expression in the law too. And here
again, that’s about the best that a doctrine not built for the
expression of non-doctrinal influences can do.
CONCLUSION
In retrospect, I have asked much of Kozel’s theory of
precedent. In exploring how his theory would work in practice, I
have measured it against a standard that aims to prevent changes
in the law based on changes in personnel, while allowing changes
in the law based on changes in society—a standard that rejects
abrupt change but embraces that which is incremental. That’s a
tall order to fill. Yet that is the balance at the core of the complex
doctrine of stare decisis, and Kozel’s theory of precedent
improves upon that balance significantly.
In the end, Kozel is right—his “second-best” theory of
precedent is the best one can do in light of the complex legal
landscape in which the Justices operate—but he is more right than
he knows. In resolving the tension between settled versus right,
Kozel’s theory produces an equilibrium in practice that might best
be described as “mostly settled, but right for now.” It is mostly
settled—that is, settled in a way that gives stability to the law—
but also right for now, as in, right for the time being, with the
recognition that larger societal change may someday call for
constitutional change as well. And that’s about the best one can
do in light of the extra-legal landscape in which the Justices
operate too.

